mirror of
https://github.com/Nheko-Reborn/nheko.git
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1538 lines
77 KiB
C++
1538 lines
77 KiB
C++
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2021 Nheko Contributors
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//
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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#include "Olm.h"
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#include <QObject>
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#include <QTimer>
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#include <nlohmann/json.hpp>
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#include <variant>
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#include <mtx/responses/common.hpp>
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#include <mtx/secret_storage.hpp>
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#include "Cache.h"
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#include "Cache_p.h"
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#include "ChatPage.h"
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#include "DeviceVerificationFlow.h"
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#include "Logging.h"
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#include "MatrixClient.h"
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#include "UserSettingsPage.h"
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#include "Utils.h"
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namespace {
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auto client_ = std::make_unique<mtx::crypto::OlmClient>();
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std::map<std::string, std::string> request_id_to_secret_name;
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const std::string STORAGE_SECRET_KEY("secret");
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constexpr auto MEGOLM_ALGO = "m.megolm.v1.aes-sha2";
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}
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namespace olm {
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void
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from_json(const nlohmann::json &obj, OlmMessage &msg)
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{
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if (obj.at("type") != "m.room.encrypted")
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throw std::invalid_argument("invalid type for olm message");
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if (obj.at("content").at("algorithm") != OLM_ALGO)
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throw std::invalid_argument("invalid algorithm for olm message");
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msg.sender = obj.at("sender");
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msg.sender_key = obj.at("content").at("sender_key");
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msg.ciphertext = obj.at("content")
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.at("ciphertext")
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.get<std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent>>();
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}
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mtx::crypto::OlmClient *
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client()
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{
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return client_.get();
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}
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static void
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handle_secret_request(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest> *e,
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const std::string &sender)
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{
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using namespace mtx::events;
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if (e->content.action != mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request)
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return;
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auto local_user = http::client()->user_id();
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if (sender != local_user.to_string())
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return;
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auto verificationStatus = cache::verificationStatus(local_user.to_string());
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if (!verificationStatus)
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return;
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auto deviceKeys = cache::userKeys(local_user.to_string());
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if (!deviceKeys)
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return;
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if (std::find(verificationStatus->verified_devices.begin(),
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verificationStatus->verified_devices.end(),
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e->content.requesting_device_id) ==
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verificationStatus->verified_devices.end())
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return;
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// this is a verified device
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mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::SecretSend> secretSend;
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secretSend.type = EventType::SecretSend;
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secretSend.content.request_id = e->content.request_id;
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auto secret = cache::client()->secret(e->content.name);
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if (!secret)
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return;
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secretSend.content.secret = secret.value();
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send_encrypted_to_device_messages(
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{{local_user.to_string(), {{e->content.requesting_device_id}}}}, secretSend);
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nhlog::net()->info("Sent secret '{}' to ({},{})",
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e->content.name,
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local_user.to_string(),
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e->content.requesting_device_id);
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}
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void
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handle_to_device_messages(const std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents> &msgs)
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{
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if (msgs.empty())
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return;
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nhlog::crypto()->info("received {} to_device messages", msgs.size());
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nlohmann::json j_msg;
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for (const auto &msg : msgs) {
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j_msg = std::visit([](auto &e) { return json(e); }, std::move(msg));
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if (j_msg.count("type") == 0) {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn("received message with no type field: {}",
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j_msg.dump(2));
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continue;
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}
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std::string msg_type = j_msg.at("type");
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if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::RoomEncrypted)) {
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try {
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olm::OlmMessage olm_msg = j_msg;
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cache::client()->query_keys(
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olm_msg.sender,
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[olm_msg](const UserKeyCache &userKeys, mtx::http::RequestErr e) {
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if (e) {
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nhlog::crypto()->error(
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"Failed to query user keys, dropping olm "
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"message");
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return;
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}
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handle_olm_message(std::move(olm_msg), userKeys);
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});
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} catch (const nlohmann::json::exception &e) {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn(
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"parsing error for olm message: {} {}", e.what(), j_msg.dump(2));
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} catch (const std::invalid_argument &e) {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn("validation error for olm message: {} {}",
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e.what(),
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j_msg.dump(2));
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}
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} else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::RoomKeyRequest)) {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn("handling key request event: {}", j_msg.dump(2));
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try {
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mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest> req = j_msg;
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if (req.content.action == mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request)
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handle_key_request_message(req);
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else
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nhlog::crypto()->warn(
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"ignore key request (unhandled action): {}",
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req.content.request_id);
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} catch (const nlohmann::json::exception &e) {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn(
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"parsing error for key_request message: {} {}",
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e.what(),
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j_msg.dump(2));
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}
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} else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationAccept)) {
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auto message = std::get<
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mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationAccept>>(msg);
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationAccept(message.content);
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} else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationRequest)) {
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auto message = std::get<
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mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationRequest>>(msg);
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationRequest(message.content,
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message.sender);
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} else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationCancel)) {
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auto message = std::get<
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mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationCancel>>(msg);
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationCancel(message.content);
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} else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationKey)) {
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auto message =
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std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationKey>>(
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msg);
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationKey(message.content);
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} else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationMac)) {
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auto message =
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std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac>>(
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msg);
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationMac(message.content);
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} else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationStart)) {
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auto message = std::get<
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mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart>>(msg);
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationStart(message.content,
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message.sender);
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} else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationReady)) {
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auto message = std::get<
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mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationReady>>(msg);
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationReady(message.content);
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} else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::KeyVerificationDone)) {
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auto message =
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std::get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationDone>>(
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msg);
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationDone(message.content);
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} else if (auto e =
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std::get_if<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>>(
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&msg)) {
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handle_secret_request(e, e->sender);
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} else {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn("unhandled event: {}", j_msg.dump(2));
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}
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}
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}
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void
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handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg, const UserKeyCache &otherUserDeviceKeys)
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{
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nhlog::crypto()->info("sender : {}", msg.sender);
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nhlog::crypto()->info("sender_key: {}", msg.sender_key);
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if (msg.sender_key == olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519) {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn("Ignoring olm message from ourselves!");
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return;
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}
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const auto my_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
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bool failed_decryption = false;
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for (const auto &cipher : msg.ciphertext) {
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// We skip messages not meant for the current device.
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if (cipher.first != my_key) {
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nhlog::crypto()->debug(
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"Skipping message for {} since we are {}.", cipher.first, my_key);
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continue;
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}
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const auto type = cipher.second.type;
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nhlog::crypto()->info("type: {}", type == 0 ? "OLM_PRE_KEY" : "OLM_MESSAGE");
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auto payload = try_olm_decryption(msg.sender_key, cipher.second);
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if (payload.is_null()) {
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// Check for PRE_KEY message
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if (cipher.second.type == 0) {
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payload = handle_pre_key_olm_message(
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msg.sender, msg.sender_key, cipher.second);
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} else {
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nhlog::crypto()->error("Undecryptable olm message!");
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failed_decryption = true;
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continue;
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}
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}
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if (!payload.is_null()) {
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mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents device_event;
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// Other properties are included in order to prevent an attacker from
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// publishing someone else's curve25519 keys as their own and subsequently
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// claiming to have sent messages which they didn't. sender must correspond
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// to the user who sent the event, recipient to the local user, and
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// recipient_keys to the local ed25519 key.
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std::string receiver_ed25519 = payload["recipient_keys"]["ed25519"];
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if (receiver_ed25519.empty() ||
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receiver_ed25519 != olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519) {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn(
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"Decrypted event doesn't include our ed25519: {}",
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payload.dump());
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return;
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}
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std::string receiver = payload["recipient"];
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if (receiver.empty() || receiver != http::client()->user_id().to_string()) {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn(
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"Decrypted event doesn't include our user_id: {}",
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payload.dump());
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return;
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}
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// Clients must confirm that the sender_key and the ed25519 field value
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// under the keys property match the keys returned by /keys/query for the
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// given user, and must also verify the signature of the payload. Without
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// this check, a client cannot be sure that the sender device owns the
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// private part of the ed25519 key it claims to have in the Olm payload.
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// This is crucial when the ed25519 key corresponds to a verified device.
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std::string sender_ed25519 = payload["keys"]["ed25519"];
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if (sender_ed25519.empty()) {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn(
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"Decrypted event doesn't include sender ed25519: {}",
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payload.dump());
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return;
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}
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bool from_their_device = false;
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for (auto [device_id, key] : otherUserDeviceKeys.device_keys) {
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auto c_key = key.keys.find("curve25519:" + device_id);
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auto e_key = key.keys.find("ed25519:" + device_id);
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if (c_key == key.keys.end() || e_key == key.keys.end()) {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn(
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"Skipping device {} as we have no keys for it.",
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device_id);
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} else if (c_key->second == msg.sender_key &&
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e_key->second == sender_ed25519) {
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from_their_device = true;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (!from_their_device) {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event isn't sent from a device "
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"listed by that user! {}",
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payload.dump());
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return;
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}
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{
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std::string msg_type = payload["type"];
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json event_array = json::array();
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event_array.push_back(payload);
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std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents> temp_events;
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mtx::responses::utils::parse_device_events(event_array,
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temp_events);
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if (temp_events.empty()) {
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nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted unknown event: {}",
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payload.dump());
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return;
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}
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device_event = temp_events.at(0);
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}
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using namespace mtx::events;
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if (auto e1 =
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std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationAccept>>(&device_event)) {
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationAccept(e1->content);
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} else if (auto e2 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationRequest>>(
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&device_event)) {
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationRequest(e2->content,
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e2->sender);
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} else if (auto e3 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationCancel>>(
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&device_event)) {
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationCancel(e3->content);
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} else if (auto e4 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationKey>>(
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&device_event)) {
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationKey(e4->content);
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} else if (auto e5 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationMac>>(
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&device_event)) {
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationMac(e5->content);
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} else if (auto e6 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationStart>>(
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&device_event)) {
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationStart(e6->content,
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e6->sender);
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} else if (auto e7 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationReady>>(
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&device_event)) {
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationReady(e7->content);
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} else if (auto e8 = std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::KeyVerificationDone>>(
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&device_event)) {
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ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationDone(e8->content);
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} else if (auto roomKey =
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std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::RoomKey>>(&device_event)) {
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create_inbound_megolm_session(
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*roomKey, msg.sender_key, sender_ed25519);
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} else if (auto forwardedRoomKey =
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std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::ForwardedRoomKey>>(
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&device_event)) {
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forwardedRoomKey->content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain.push_back(
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msg.sender_key);
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import_inbound_megolm_session(*forwardedRoomKey);
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} else if (auto e =
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std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::SecretSend>>(&device_event)) {
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auto local_user = http::client()->user_id();
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if (msg.sender != local_user.to_string())
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return;
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auto secret_name =
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request_id_to_secret_name.find(e->content.request_id);
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if (secret_name != request_id_to_secret_name.end()) {
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nhlog::crypto()->info("Received secret: {}",
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secret_name->second);
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mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest secretRequest{};
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secretRequest.action =
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mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Cancellation;
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secretRequest.requesting_device_id =
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http::client()->device_id();
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secretRequest.request_id = e->content.request_id;
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auto verificationStatus =
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cache::verificationStatus(local_user.to_string());
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if (!verificationStatus)
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return;
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auto deviceKeys = cache::userKeys(local_user.to_string());
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std::string sender_device_id;
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if (deviceKeys) {
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for (auto &[dev, key] : deviceKeys->device_keys) {
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if (key.keys["curve25519:" + dev] ==
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msg.sender_key) {
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sender_device_id = dev;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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std::map<
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mtx::identifiers::User,
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std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>>
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body;
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for (const auto &dev :
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verificationStatus->verified_devices) {
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if (dev != secretRequest.requesting_device_id &&
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dev != sender_device_id)
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body[local_user][dev] = secretRequest;
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}
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http::client()
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->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>(
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http::client()->generate_txn_id(),
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body,
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[name =
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secret_name->second](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
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if (err) {
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nhlog::net()->error(
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"Failed to send request cancellation "
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"for secrect "
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"'{}'",
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name);
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}
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});
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cache::client()->storeSecret(secret_name->second,
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e->content.secret);
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request_id_to_secret_name.erase(secret_name);
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}
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} else if (auto sec_req =
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std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::SecretRequest>>(&device_event)) {
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handle_secret_request(sec_req, msg.sender);
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}
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return;
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} else {
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failed_decryption = true;
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}
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}
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if (failed_decryption) {
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try {
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std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets;
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for (auto [device_id, key] : otherUserDeviceKeys.device_keys) {
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if (key.keys.at("curve25519:" + device_id) == msg.sender_key)
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targets[msg.sender].push_back(device_id);
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}
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send_encrypted_to_device_messages(
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targets, mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::Dummy>{}, true);
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nhlog::crypto()->info("Recovering from broken olm channel with {}:{}",
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msg.sender,
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msg.sender_key);
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} catch (std::exception &e) {
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nhlog::crypto()->error("Failed to recover from broken olm sessions: {}",
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e.what());
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}
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}
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}
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|
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nlohmann::json
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handle_pre_key_olm_message(const std::string &sender,
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const std::string &sender_key,
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const mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent &content)
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{
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nhlog::crypto()->info("opening olm session with {}", sender);
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mtx::crypto::OlmSessionPtr inbound_session = nullptr;
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try {
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inbound_session =
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olm::client()->create_inbound_session_from(sender_key, content.body);
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// We also remove the one time key used to establish that
|
|
// session so we'll have to update our copy of the account object.
|
|
cache::saveOlmAccount(olm::client()->save("secret"));
|
|
} catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->critical(
|
|
"failed to create inbound session with {}: {}", sender, e.what());
|
|
return {};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!mtx::crypto::matches_inbound_session_from(
|
|
inbound_session.get(), sender_key, content.body)) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->warn("inbound olm session doesn't match sender's key ({})",
|
|
sender);
|
|
return {};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mtx::crypto::BinaryBuf output;
|
|
try {
|
|
output =
|
|
olm::client()->decrypt_message(inbound_session.get(), content.type, content.body);
|
|
} catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->critical(
|
|
"failed to decrypt olm message {}: {}", content.body, e.what());
|
|
return {};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto plaintext = json::parse(std::string((char *)output.data(), output.size()));
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug("decrypted message: \n {}", plaintext.dump(2));
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug("New olm session: {}",
|
|
mtx::crypto::session_id(inbound_session.get()));
|
|
cache::saveOlmSession(
|
|
sender_key, std::move(inbound_session), QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch());
|
|
} catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
|
|
nhlog::db()->warn(
|
|
"failed to save inbound olm session from {}: {}", sender, e.what());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return plaintext;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mtx::events::msg::Encrypted
|
|
encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id, nlohmann::json body)
|
|
{
|
|
using namespace mtx::events;
|
|
using namespace mtx::identifiers;
|
|
|
|
auto own_user_id = http::client()->user_id().to_string();
|
|
|
|
auto members = cache::client()->getMembersWithKeys(
|
|
room_id, UserSettings::instance()->onlyShareKeysWithVerifiedUsers());
|
|
|
|
std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> sendSessionTo;
|
|
mtx::crypto::OutboundGroupSessionPtr session = nullptr;
|
|
GroupSessionData group_session_data;
|
|
|
|
if (cache::outboundMegolmSessionExists(room_id)) {
|
|
auto res = cache::getOutboundMegolmSession(room_id);
|
|
auto encryptionSettings = cache::client()->roomEncryptionSettings(room_id);
|
|
mtx::events::state::Encryption defaultSettings;
|
|
|
|
// rotate if we crossed the limits for this key
|
|
if (res.data.message_index <
|
|
encryptionSettings.value_or(defaultSettings).rotation_period_msgs &&
|
|
(QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch() - res.data.timestamp) <
|
|
encryptionSettings.value_or(defaultSettings).rotation_period_ms) {
|
|
auto member_it = members.begin();
|
|
auto session_member_it = res.data.currently.keys.begin();
|
|
auto session_member_it_end = res.data.currently.keys.end();
|
|
|
|
while (member_it != members.end() ||
|
|
session_member_it != session_member_it_end) {
|
|
if (member_it == members.end()) {
|
|
// a member left, purge session!
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug(
|
|
"Rotating megolm session because of left member");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (session_member_it == session_member_it_end) {
|
|
// share with all remaining members
|
|
while (member_it != members.end()) {
|
|
sendSessionTo[member_it->first] = {};
|
|
|
|
if (member_it->second)
|
|
for (const auto &dev :
|
|
member_it->second->device_keys)
|
|
if (member_it->first !=
|
|
own_user_id ||
|
|
dev.first != device_id)
|
|
sendSessionTo[member_it
|
|
->first]
|
|
.push_back(dev.first);
|
|
|
|
++member_it;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
session = std::move(res.session);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (member_it->first > session_member_it->first) {
|
|
// a member left, purge session
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug(
|
|
"Rotating megolm session because of left member");
|
|
break;
|
|
} else if (member_it->first < session_member_it->first) {
|
|
// new member, send them the session at this index
|
|
sendSessionTo[member_it->first] = {};
|
|
|
|
if (member_it->second) {
|
|
for (const auto &dev :
|
|
member_it->second->device_keys)
|
|
if (member_it->first != own_user_id ||
|
|
dev.first != device_id)
|
|
sendSessionTo[member_it->first]
|
|
.push_back(dev.first);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
++member_it;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// compare devices
|
|
bool device_removed = false;
|
|
for (const auto &dev :
|
|
session_member_it->second.deviceids) {
|
|
if (!member_it->second ||
|
|
!member_it->second->device_keys.count(
|
|
dev.first)) {
|
|
device_removed = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (device_removed) {
|
|
// device removed, rotate session!
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug(
|
|
"Rotating megolm session because of removed "
|
|
"device of {}",
|
|
member_it->first);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// check for new devices to share with
|
|
if (member_it->second)
|
|
for (const auto &dev :
|
|
member_it->second->device_keys)
|
|
if (!session_member_it->second.deviceids
|
|
.count(dev.first) &&
|
|
(member_it->first != own_user_id ||
|
|
dev.first != device_id))
|
|
sendSessionTo[member_it->first]
|
|
.push_back(dev.first);
|
|
|
|
++member_it;
|
|
++session_member_it;
|
|
if (member_it == members.end() &&
|
|
session_member_it == session_member_it_end) {
|
|
// all devices match or are newly added
|
|
session = std::move(res.session);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
group_session_data = std::move(res.data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!session) {
|
|
nhlog::ui()->debug("creating new outbound megolm session");
|
|
|
|
// Create a new outbound megolm session.
|
|
session = olm::client()->init_outbound_group_session();
|
|
const auto session_id = mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get());
|
|
const auto session_key = mtx::crypto::session_key(session.get());
|
|
|
|
// Saving the new megolm session.
|
|
GroupSessionData session_data{};
|
|
session_data.message_index = 0;
|
|
session_data.timestamp = QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch();
|
|
session_data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519;
|
|
|
|
sendSessionTo.clear();
|
|
|
|
for (const auto &[user, devices] : members) {
|
|
sendSessionTo[user] = {};
|
|
session_data.currently.keys[user] = {};
|
|
if (devices) {
|
|
for (const auto &[device_id_, key] : devices->device_keys) {
|
|
(void)key;
|
|
if (device_id != device_id_ || user != own_user_id) {
|
|
sendSessionTo[user].push_back(device_id_);
|
|
session_data.currently.keys[user]
|
|
.deviceids[device_id_] = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
MegolmSessionIndex index;
|
|
index.room_id = room_id;
|
|
index.session_id = session_id;
|
|
index.sender_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
|
|
auto megolm_session =
|
|
olm::client()->init_inbound_group_session(session_key);
|
|
cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(
|
|
index, std::move(megolm_session), session_data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cache::saveOutboundMegolmSession(room_id, session_data, session);
|
|
group_session_data = std::move(session_data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::RoomKey> megolm_payload{};
|
|
megolm_payload.content.algorithm = MEGOLM_ALGO;
|
|
megolm_payload.content.room_id = room_id;
|
|
megolm_payload.content.session_id = mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get());
|
|
megolm_payload.content.session_key = mtx::crypto::session_key(session.get());
|
|
megolm_payload.type = mtx::events::EventType::RoomKey;
|
|
|
|
if (!sendSessionTo.empty())
|
|
olm::send_encrypted_to_device_messages(sendSessionTo, megolm_payload);
|
|
|
|
// relations shouldn't be encrypted...
|
|
mtx::common::Relations relations = mtx::common::parse_relations(body["content"]);
|
|
|
|
auto payload = olm::client()->encrypt_group_message(session.get(), body.dump());
|
|
|
|
// Prepare the m.room.encrypted event.
|
|
msg::Encrypted data;
|
|
data.ciphertext = std::string((char *)payload.data(), payload.size());
|
|
data.sender_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
|
|
data.session_id = mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get());
|
|
data.device_id = device_id;
|
|
data.algorithm = MEGOLM_ALGO;
|
|
data.relations = relations;
|
|
|
|
group_session_data.message_index = olm_outbound_group_session_message_index(session.get());
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug("next message_index {}", group_session_data.message_index);
|
|
|
|
// update current set of members for the session with the new members and that message_index
|
|
for (const auto &[user, devices] : sendSessionTo) {
|
|
if (!group_session_data.currently.keys.count(user))
|
|
group_session_data.currently.keys[user] = {};
|
|
|
|
for (const auto &device_id_ : devices) {
|
|
if (!group_session_data.currently.keys[user].deviceids.count(device_id_))
|
|
group_session_data.currently.keys[user].deviceids[device_id_] =
|
|
group_session_data.message_index;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We need to re-pickle the session after we send a message to save the new message_index.
|
|
cache::updateOutboundMegolmSession(room_id, group_session_data, session);
|
|
|
|
return data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nlohmann::json
|
|
try_olm_decryption(const std::string &sender_key, const mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent &msg)
|
|
{
|
|
auto session_ids = cache::getOlmSessions(sender_key);
|
|
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->info("attempt to decrypt message with {} known session_ids",
|
|
session_ids.size());
|
|
|
|
for (const auto &id : session_ids) {
|
|
auto session = cache::getOlmSession(sender_key, id);
|
|
|
|
if (!session) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->warn("Unknown olm session: {}:{}", sender_key, id);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mtx::crypto::BinaryBuf text;
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
text = olm::client()->decrypt_message(session->get(), msg.type, msg.body);
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug("Updated olm session: {}",
|
|
mtx::crypto::session_id(session->get()));
|
|
cache::saveOlmSession(
|
|
id, std::move(session.value()), QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch());
|
|
} catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug("failed to decrypt olm message ({}, {}) with {}: {}",
|
|
msg.type,
|
|
sender_key,
|
|
id,
|
|
e.what());
|
|
continue;
|
|
} catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save session: {}", e.what());
|
|
return {};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
return json::parse(std::string_view((char *)text.data(), text.size()));
|
|
} catch (const json::exception &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->critical(
|
|
"failed to parse the decrypted session msg: {} {}",
|
|
e.what(),
|
|
std::string_view((char *)text.data(), text.size()));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return {};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
create_inbound_megolm_session(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::RoomKey> &roomKey,
|
|
const std::string &sender_key,
|
|
const std::string &sender_ed25519)
|
|
{
|
|
MegolmSessionIndex index;
|
|
index.room_id = roomKey.content.room_id;
|
|
index.session_id = roomKey.content.session_id;
|
|
index.sender_key = sender_key;
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
GroupSessionData data{};
|
|
data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = {sender_key};
|
|
data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = sender_ed25519;
|
|
|
|
auto megolm_session =
|
|
olm::client()->init_inbound_group_session(roomKey.content.session_key);
|
|
cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), data);
|
|
} catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
|
|
return;
|
|
} catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to create inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->info(
|
|
"established inbound megolm session ({}, {})", roomKey.content.room_id, roomKey.sender);
|
|
|
|
ChatPage::instance()->receivedSessionKey(index.room_id, index.session_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
import_inbound_megolm_session(
|
|
const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey> &roomKey)
|
|
{
|
|
MegolmSessionIndex index;
|
|
index.room_id = roomKey.content.room_id;
|
|
index.session_id = roomKey.content.session_id;
|
|
index.sender_key = roomKey.content.sender_key;
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
auto megolm_session =
|
|
olm::client()->import_inbound_group_session(roomKey.content.session_key);
|
|
|
|
GroupSessionData data{};
|
|
data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain =
|
|
roomKey.content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
|
|
data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = roomKey.content.sender_claimed_ed25519_key;
|
|
|
|
cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), data);
|
|
} catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
|
|
return;
|
|
} catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to import inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->info(
|
|
"established inbound megolm session ({}, {})", roomKey.content.room_id, roomKey.sender);
|
|
|
|
ChatPage::instance()->receivedSessionKey(index.room_id, index.session_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
mark_keys_as_published()
|
|
{
|
|
olm::client()->mark_keys_as_published();
|
|
cache::saveOlmAccount(olm::client()->save(STORAGE_SECRET_KEY));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
send_key_request_for(mtx::events::EncryptedEvent<mtx::events::msg::Encrypted> e,
|
|
const std::string &request_id,
|
|
bool cancel)
|
|
{
|
|
using namespace mtx::events;
|
|
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug("sending key request: sender_key {}, session_id {}",
|
|
e.content.sender_key,
|
|
e.content.session_id);
|
|
|
|
mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest request;
|
|
request.action = cancel ? mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Cancellation
|
|
: mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request;
|
|
|
|
request.algorithm = MEGOLM_ALGO;
|
|
request.room_id = e.room_id;
|
|
request.sender_key = e.content.sender_key;
|
|
request.session_id = e.content.session_id;
|
|
request.request_id = request_id;
|
|
request.requesting_device_id = http::client()->device_id();
|
|
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug("m.room_key_request: {}", json(request).dump(2));
|
|
|
|
std::map<mtx::identifiers::User, std::map<std::string, decltype(request)>> body;
|
|
body[mtx::identifiers::parse<mtx::identifiers::User>(e.sender)][e.content.device_id] =
|
|
request;
|
|
body[http::client()->user_id()]["*"] = request;
|
|
|
|
http::client()->send_to_device(
|
|
http::client()->generate_txn_id(), body, [e](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
nhlog::net()->warn("failed to send "
|
|
"send_to_device "
|
|
"message: {}",
|
|
err->matrix_error.error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nhlog::net()->info("m.room_key_request sent to {}:{} and your own devices",
|
|
e.sender,
|
|
e.content.device_id);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
handle_key_request_message(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest> &req)
|
|
{
|
|
if (req.content.algorithm != MEGOLM_ALGO) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug("ignoring key request {} with invalid algorithm: {}",
|
|
req.content.request_id,
|
|
req.content.algorithm);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if we were the sender of the session being requested (unless it is actually us
|
|
// requesting the session).
|
|
if (req.sender != http::client()->user_id().to_string() &&
|
|
req.content.sender_key != olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug(
|
|
"ignoring key request {} because we did not create the requested session: "
|
|
"\nrequested({}) ours({})",
|
|
req.content.request_id,
|
|
req.content.sender_key,
|
|
olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that the requested session_id and the one we have saved match.
|
|
MegolmSessionIndex index{};
|
|
index.room_id = req.content.room_id;
|
|
index.session_id = req.content.session_id;
|
|
index.sender_key = req.content.sender_key;
|
|
|
|
// Check if we have the keys for the requested session.
|
|
auto sessionData = cache::getMegolmSessionData(index);
|
|
if (!sessionData) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->warn("requested session not found in room: {}",
|
|
req.content.room_id);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const auto session = cache::getInboundMegolmSession(index);
|
|
if (!session) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->warn("No session with id {} in db", req.content.session_id);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!cache::isRoomMember(req.sender, req.content.room_id)) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->warn(
|
|
"user {} that requested the session key is not member of the room {}",
|
|
req.sender,
|
|
req.content.room_id);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// check if device is verified
|
|
auto verificationStatus = cache::verificationStatus(req.sender);
|
|
bool verifiedDevice = false;
|
|
if (verificationStatus &&
|
|
// Share keys, if the option to share with trusted users is enabled or with yourself
|
|
(ChatPage::instance()->userSettings()->shareKeysWithTrustedUsers() ||
|
|
req.sender == http::client()->user_id().to_string())) {
|
|
for (const auto &dev : verificationStatus->verified_devices) {
|
|
if (dev == req.content.requesting_device_id) {
|
|
verifiedDevice = true;
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug("Verified device: {}", dev);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool shouldSeeKeys = false;
|
|
uint64_t minimumIndex = -1;
|
|
if (sessionData->currently.keys.count(req.sender)) {
|
|
if (sessionData->currently.keys.at(req.sender)
|
|
.deviceids.count(req.content.requesting_device_id)) {
|
|
shouldSeeKeys = true;
|
|
minimumIndex = sessionData->currently.keys.at(req.sender)
|
|
.deviceids.at(req.content.requesting_device_id);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!verifiedDevice && !shouldSeeKeys) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug("ignoring key request for room {}", req.content.room_id);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (verifiedDevice) {
|
|
// share the minimum index we have
|
|
minimumIndex = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
auto session_key = mtx::crypto::export_session(session.get(), minimumIndex);
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
// Prepare the m.room_key event.
|
|
//
|
|
mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey forward_key{};
|
|
forward_key.algorithm = MEGOLM_ALGO;
|
|
forward_key.room_id = index.room_id;
|
|
forward_key.session_id = index.session_id;
|
|
forward_key.session_key = session_key;
|
|
forward_key.sender_key = index.sender_key;
|
|
|
|
// TODO(Nico): Figure out if this is correct
|
|
forward_key.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = sessionData->sender_claimed_ed25519_key;
|
|
forward_key.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain =
|
|
sessionData->forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
|
|
|
|
send_megolm_key_to_device(
|
|
req.sender, req.content.requesting_device_id, forward_key);
|
|
} catch (std::exception &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->error("Failed to forward session key: {}", e.what());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
send_megolm_key_to_device(const std::string &user_id,
|
|
const std::string &device_id,
|
|
const mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey &payload)
|
|
{
|
|
mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::ForwardedRoomKey> room_key;
|
|
room_key.content = payload;
|
|
room_key.type = mtx::events::EventType::ForwardedRoomKey;
|
|
|
|
std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets;
|
|
targets[user_id] = {device_id};
|
|
send_encrypted_to_device_messages(targets, room_key);
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug("Forwarded key to {}:{}", user_id, device_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DecryptionResult
|
|
decryptEvent(const MegolmSessionIndex &index,
|
|
const mtx::events::EncryptedEvent<mtx::events::msg::Encrypted> &event)
|
|
{
|
|
try {
|
|
if (!cache::client()->inboundMegolmSessionExists(index)) {
|
|
return {DecryptionErrorCode::MissingSession, std::nullopt, std::nullopt};
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
|
|
return {DecryptionErrorCode::DbError, e.what(), std::nullopt};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO: Lookup index,event_id,origin_server_ts tuple for replay attack errors
|
|
|
|
std::string msg_str;
|
|
try {
|
|
auto session = cache::client()->getInboundMegolmSession(index);
|
|
|
|
auto res =
|
|
olm::client()->decrypt_group_message(session.get(), event.content.ciphertext);
|
|
msg_str = std::string((char *)res.data.data(), res.data.size());
|
|
} catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
|
|
return {DecryptionErrorCode::DbError, e.what(), std::nullopt};
|
|
} catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
|
|
if (e.error_code() == mtx::crypto::OlmErrorCode::UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX)
|
|
return {DecryptionErrorCode::MissingSessionIndex, e.what(), std::nullopt};
|
|
return {DecryptionErrorCode::DecryptionFailed, e.what(), std::nullopt};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
// Add missing fields for the event.
|
|
json body = json::parse(msg_str);
|
|
body["event_id"] = event.event_id;
|
|
body["sender"] = event.sender;
|
|
body["origin_server_ts"] = event.origin_server_ts;
|
|
body["unsigned"] = event.unsigned_data;
|
|
|
|
// relations are unencrypted in content...
|
|
mtx::common::add_relations(body["content"], event.content.relations);
|
|
|
|
mtx::events::collections::TimelineEvent te;
|
|
mtx::events::collections::from_json(body, te);
|
|
|
|
return {DecryptionErrorCode::NoError, std::nullopt, std::move(te.data)};
|
|
} catch (std::exception &e) {
|
|
return {DecryptionErrorCode::ParsingFailed, e.what(), std::nullopt};
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypto::Trust
|
|
calculate_trust(const std::string &user_id, const std::string &curve25519)
|
|
{
|
|
auto status = cache::client()->verificationStatus(user_id);
|
|
crypto::Trust trustlevel = crypto::Trust::Unverified;
|
|
if (status.verified_device_keys.count(curve25519))
|
|
trustlevel = status.verified_device_keys.at(curve25519);
|
|
|
|
return trustlevel;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//! Send encrypted to device messages, targets is a map from userid to device ids or {} for all
|
|
//! devices
|
|
void
|
|
send_encrypted_to_device_messages(const std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets,
|
|
const mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents &event,
|
|
bool force_new_session)
|
|
{
|
|
nlohmann::json ev_json = std::visit([](const auto &e) { return json(e); }, event);
|
|
|
|
std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> keysToQuery;
|
|
mtx::requests::ClaimKeys claims;
|
|
std::map<mtx::identifiers::User, std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>>
|
|
messages;
|
|
std::map<std::string, std::map<std::string, DevicePublicKeys>> pks;
|
|
|
|
auto our_curve = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
|
|
|
|
for (const auto &[user, devices] : targets) {
|
|
auto deviceKeys = cache::client()->userKeys(user);
|
|
|
|
// no keys for user, query them
|
|
if (!deviceKeys) {
|
|
keysToQuery[user] = devices;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto deviceTargets = devices;
|
|
if (devices.empty()) {
|
|
deviceTargets.clear();
|
|
for (const auto &[device, keys] : deviceKeys->device_keys) {
|
|
(void)keys;
|
|
deviceTargets.push_back(device);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (const auto &device : deviceTargets) {
|
|
if (!deviceKeys->device_keys.count(device)) {
|
|
keysToQuery[user] = {};
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto d = deviceKeys->device_keys.at(device);
|
|
|
|
if (!d.keys.count("curve25519:" + device) ||
|
|
!d.keys.count("ed25519:" + device)) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->warn("Skipping device {} since it has no keys!",
|
|
device);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto device_curve = d.keys.at("curve25519:" + device);
|
|
if (device_curve == our_curve) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->warn("Skipping our own device, since sending "
|
|
"ourselves olm messages makes no sense.");
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto session = cache::getLatestOlmSession(device_curve);
|
|
if (!session || force_new_session) {
|
|
static QMap<QPair<std::string, std::string>, qint64> rateLimit;
|
|
auto currentTime = QDateTime::currentSecsSinceEpoch();
|
|
if (rateLimit.value(QPair(user, device)) + 60 * 60 * 10 <
|
|
currentTime) {
|
|
claims.one_time_keys[user][device] =
|
|
mtx::crypto::SIGNED_CURVE25519;
|
|
pks[user][device].ed25519 = d.keys.at("ed25519:" + device);
|
|
pks[user][device].curve25519 =
|
|
d.keys.at("curve25519:" + device);
|
|
|
|
rateLimit.insert(QPair(user, device), currentTime);
|
|
} else {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->warn("Not creating new session with {}:{} "
|
|
"because of rate limit",
|
|
user,
|
|
device);
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
messages[mtx::identifiers::parse<mtx::identifiers::User>(user)][device] =
|
|
olm::client()
|
|
->create_olm_encrypted_content(session->get(),
|
|
ev_json,
|
|
UserId(user),
|
|
d.keys.at("ed25519:" + device),
|
|
device_curve)
|
|
.get<mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>();
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug("Updated olm session: {}",
|
|
mtx::crypto::session_id(session->get()));
|
|
cache::saveOlmSession(d.keys.at("curve25519:" + device),
|
|
std::move(*session),
|
|
QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch());
|
|
} catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
|
|
nhlog::db()->critical("failed to save outbound olm session: {}",
|
|
e.what());
|
|
} catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->critical(
|
|
"failed to pickle outbound olm session: {}", e.what());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!messages.empty())
|
|
http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>(
|
|
http::client()->generate_txn_id(), messages, [](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
nhlog::net()->warn("failed to send "
|
|
"send_to_device "
|
|
"message: {}",
|
|
err->matrix_error.error);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
auto BindPks = [ev_json](decltype(pks) pks_temp) {
|
|
return [pks = pks_temp, ev_json](const mtx::responses::ClaimKeys &res,
|
|
mtx::http::RequestErr) {
|
|
std::map<mtx::identifiers::User,
|
|
std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>>
|
|
messages;
|
|
for (const auto &[user_id, retrieved_devices] : res.one_time_keys) {
|
|
nhlog::net()->debug("claimed keys for {}", user_id);
|
|
if (retrieved_devices.size() == 0) {
|
|
nhlog::net()->debug(
|
|
"no one-time keys found for user_id: {}", user_id);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (const auto &rd : retrieved_devices) {
|
|
const auto device_id = rd.first;
|
|
|
|
nhlog::net()->debug(
|
|
"{} : \n {}", device_id, rd.second.dump(2));
|
|
|
|
if (rd.second.empty() ||
|
|
!rd.second.begin()->contains("key")) {
|
|
nhlog::net()->warn(
|
|
"Skipping device {} as it has no key.",
|
|
device_id);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto otk = rd.second.begin()->at("key");
|
|
|
|
auto sign_key = pks.at(user_id).at(device_id).ed25519;
|
|
auto id_key = pks.at(user_id).at(device_id).curve25519;
|
|
|
|
// Verify signature
|
|
{
|
|
auto signedKey = *rd.second.begin();
|
|
std::string signature =
|
|
signedKey["signatures"][user_id].value(
|
|
"ed25519:" + device_id, "");
|
|
|
|
if (signature.empty() ||
|
|
!mtx::crypto::ed25519_verify_signature(
|
|
sign_key, signedKey, signature)) {
|
|
nhlog::net()->warn(
|
|
"Skipping device {} as its one time key "
|
|
"has an invalid signature.",
|
|
device_id);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto session =
|
|
olm::client()->create_outbound_session(id_key, otk);
|
|
|
|
messages[mtx::identifiers::parse<mtx::identifiers::User>(
|
|
user_id)][device_id] =
|
|
olm::client()
|
|
->create_olm_encrypted_content(session.get(),
|
|
ev_json,
|
|
UserId(user_id),
|
|
sign_key,
|
|
id_key)
|
|
.get<mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>();
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->debug(
|
|
"Updated olm session: {}",
|
|
mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get()));
|
|
cache::saveOlmSession(
|
|
id_key,
|
|
std::move(session),
|
|
QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch());
|
|
} catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
|
|
nhlog::db()->critical(
|
|
"failed to save outbound olm session: {}",
|
|
e.what());
|
|
} catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->critical(
|
|
"failed to pickle outbound olm session: {}",
|
|
e.what());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
nhlog::net()->info("send_to_device: {}", user_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!messages.empty())
|
|
http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::OlmEncrypted>(
|
|
http::client()->generate_txn_id(),
|
|
messages,
|
|
[](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
nhlog::net()->warn("failed to send "
|
|
"send_to_device "
|
|
"message: {}",
|
|
err->matrix_error.error);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
};
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
http::client()->claim_keys(claims, BindPks(pks));
|
|
|
|
if (!keysToQuery.empty()) {
|
|
mtx::requests::QueryKeys req;
|
|
req.device_keys = keysToQuery;
|
|
http::client()->query_keys(
|
|
req,
|
|
[ev_json, BindPks, our_curve](const mtx::responses::QueryKeys &res,
|
|
mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
nhlog::net()->warn("failed to query device keys: {} {}",
|
|
err->matrix_error.error,
|
|
static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nhlog::net()->info("queried keys");
|
|
|
|
cache::client()->updateUserKeys(cache::nextBatchToken(), res);
|
|
|
|
mtx::requests::ClaimKeys claim_keys;
|
|
|
|
std::map<std::string, std::map<std::string, DevicePublicKeys>> deviceKeys;
|
|
|
|
for (const auto &user : res.device_keys) {
|
|
for (const auto &dev : user.second) {
|
|
const auto user_id = ::UserId(dev.second.user_id);
|
|
const auto device_id = DeviceId(dev.second.device_id);
|
|
|
|
if (user_id.get() ==
|
|
http::client()->user_id().to_string() &&
|
|
device_id.get() == http::client()->device_id())
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
const auto device_keys = dev.second.keys;
|
|
const auto curveKey = "curve25519:" + device_id.get();
|
|
const auto edKey = "ed25519:" + device_id.get();
|
|
|
|
if ((device_keys.find(curveKey) == device_keys.end()) ||
|
|
(device_keys.find(edKey) == device_keys.end())) {
|
|
nhlog::net()->debug(
|
|
"ignoring malformed keys for device {}",
|
|
device_id.get());
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DevicePublicKeys pks;
|
|
pks.ed25519 = device_keys.at(edKey);
|
|
pks.curve25519 = device_keys.at(curveKey);
|
|
|
|
if (pks.curve25519 == our_curve) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->warn(
|
|
"Skipping our own device, since sending "
|
|
"ourselves olm messages makes no sense.");
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
if (!mtx::crypto::verify_identity_signature(
|
|
dev.second, device_id, user_id)) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->warn(
|
|
"failed to verify identity keys: {}",
|
|
json(dev.second).dump(2));
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (const json::exception &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->warn(
|
|
"failed to parse device key json: {}",
|
|
e.what());
|
|
continue;
|
|
} catch (const mtx::crypto::olm_exception &e) {
|
|
nhlog::crypto()->warn(
|
|
"failed to verify device key json: {}",
|
|
e.what());
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
deviceKeys[user_id].emplace(device_id, pks);
|
|
claim_keys.one_time_keys[user.first][device_id] =
|
|
mtx::crypto::SIGNED_CURVE25519;
|
|
|
|
nhlog::net()->info("{}", device_id.get());
|
|
nhlog::net()->info(" curve25519 {}", pks.curve25519);
|
|
nhlog::net()->info(" ed25519 {}", pks.ed25519);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
http::client()->claim_keys(claim_keys, BindPks(deviceKeys));
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
request_cross_signing_keys()
|
|
{
|
|
mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest secretRequest{};
|
|
secretRequest.action = mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request;
|
|
secretRequest.requesting_device_id = http::client()->device_id();
|
|
|
|
auto local_user = http::client()->user_id();
|
|
|
|
auto verificationStatus = cache::verificationStatus(local_user.to_string());
|
|
|
|
if (!verificationStatus)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
auto request = [&](std::string secretName) {
|
|
secretRequest.name = secretName;
|
|
secretRequest.request_id = "ss." + http::client()->generate_txn_id();
|
|
|
|
request_id_to_secret_name[secretRequest.request_id] = secretRequest.name;
|
|
|
|
std::map<mtx::identifiers::User,
|
|
std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>>
|
|
body;
|
|
|
|
for (const auto &dev : verificationStatus->verified_devices) {
|
|
if (dev != secretRequest.requesting_device_id)
|
|
body[local_user][dev] = secretRequest;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>(
|
|
http::client()->generate_txn_id(),
|
|
body,
|
|
[request_id = secretRequest.request_id, secretName](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
nhlog::net()->error("Failed to send request for secrect '{}'",
|
|
secretName);
|
|
// Cancel request on UI thread
|
|
QTimer::singleShot(1, cache::client(), [request_id]() {
|
|
request_id_to_secret_name.erase(request_id);
|
|
});
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
for (const auto &dev : verificationStatus->verified_devices) {
|
|
if (dev != secretRequest.requesting_device_id)
|
|
body[local_user][dev].action =
|
|
mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Cancellation;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// timeout after 15 min
|
|
QTimer::singleShot(15 * 60 * 1000, [secretRequest, body]() {
|
|
if (request_id_to_secret_name.count(secretRequest.request_id)) {
|
|
request_id_to_secret_name.erase(secretRequest.request_id);
|
|
http::client()->send_to_device<mtx::events::msg::SecretRequest>(
|
|
http::client()->generate_txn_id(),
|
|
body,
|
|
[secretRequest](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
nhlog::net()->error(
|
|
"Failed to cancel request for secrect '{}'",
|
|
secretRequest.name);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
request(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_self_signing);
|
|
request(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_user_signing);
|
|
request(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::megolm_backup_v1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
namespace {
|
|
void
|
|
unlock_secrets(const std::string &key,
|
|
const std::map<std::string, mtx::secret_storage::AesHmacSha2EncryptedData> &secrets)
|
|
{
|
|
http::client()->secret_storage_key(
|
|
key,
|
|
[secrets](mtx::secret_storage::AesHmacSha2KeyDescription keyDesc,
|
|
mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
nhlog::net()->error("Failed to download secret storage key");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
emit ChatPage::instance()->downloadedSecrets(keyDesc, secrets);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
download_cross_signing_keys()
|
|
{
|
|
using namespace mtx::secret_storage;
|
|
http::client()->secret_storage_secret(
|
|
secrets::megolm_backup_v1, [](Secret secret, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
|
|
std::optional<Secret> backup_key;
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
backup_key = secret;
|
|
|
|
http::client()->secret_storage_secret(
|
|
secrets::cross_signing_self_signing,
|
|
[backup_key](Secret secret, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
|
|
std::optional<Secret> self_signing_key;
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
self_signing_key = secret;
|
|
|
|
http::client()->secret_storage_secret(
|
|
secrets::cross_signing_user_signing,
|
|
[backup_key, self_signing_key](Secret secret,
|
|
mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
|
|
std::optional<Secret> user_signing_key;
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
user_signing_key = secret;
|
|
|
|
std::map<std::string,
|
|
std::map<std::string, AesHmacSha2EncryptedData>>
|
|
secrets;
|
|
|
|
if (backup_key && !backup_key->encrypted.empty())
|
|
secrets[backup_key->encrypted.begin()->first]
|
|
[secrets::megolm_backup_v1] =
|
|
backup_key->encrypted.begin()->second;
|
|
if (self_signing_key && !self_signing_key->encrypted.empty())
|
|
secrets[self_signing_key->encrypted.begin()->first]
|
|
[secrets::cross_signing_self_signing] =
|
|
self_signing_key->encrypted.begin()->second;
|
|
if (user_signing_key && !user_signing_key->encrypted.empty())
|
|
secrets[user_signing_key->encrypted.begin()->first]
|
|
[secrets::cross_signing_user_signing] =
|
|
user_signing_key->encrypted.begin()->second;
|
|
|
|
for (const auto &[key, secrets] : secrets)
|
|
unlock_secrets(key, secrets);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // namespace olm
|