mirror of
https://github.com/Nheko-Reborn/nheko.git
synced 2024-11-25 12:38:48 +03:00
e89e65dc17
fixes #1499
944 lines
37 KiB
C++
944 lines
37 KiB
C++
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Nheko Contributors
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//
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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#include "DeviceVerificationFlow.h"
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#include "Cache.h"
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#include "Cache_p.h"
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#include "ChatPage.h"
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#include "Logging.h"
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#include "Utils.h"
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#include "timeline/TimelineModel.h"
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#include <QDateTime>
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#include <QTimer>
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#include <iostream>
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#include <tuple>
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static constexpr int TIMEOUT = 2 * 60 * 1000; // 2 minutes
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static mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac
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key_verification_mac(mtx::crypto::SAS *sas,
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mtx::identifiers::User sender,
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const std::string &senderDevice,
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mtx::identifiers::User receiver,
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const std::string &receiverDevice,
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const std::string &transactionId,
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std::map<std::string, std::string> keys);
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DeviceVerificationFlow::DeviceVerificationFlow(QObject *,
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DeviceVerificationFlow::Type flow_type,
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TimelineModel *model,
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const QString &userID,
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const std::vector<QString> &deviceIds_)
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: sender(false)
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, type(flow_type)
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, deviceIds(std::move(deviceIds_))
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, model_(model)
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{
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nhlog::crypto()->debug("CREATING NEW FLOW, {}, {}", static_cast<int>(flow_type), (void *)this);
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if (deviceIds.size() == 1)
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deviceId = deviceIds.front();
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timeout = new QTimer(this);
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timeout->setSingleShot(true);
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this->sas = olm::client()->sas_init();
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this->isMacVerified = false;
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auto user_id_ = userID.toStdString();
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this->toClient = mtx::identifiers::parse<mtx::identifiers::User>(user_id_);
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cache::client()->query_keys(
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user_id_, [user_id_, this](const UserKeyCache &res, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
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if (err) {
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nhlog::net()->warn("failed to query device keys: {},{}",
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mtx::errors::to_string(err->matrix_error.errcode),
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static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
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return;
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}
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if (!this->deviceId.isEmpty() &&
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(res.device_keys.find(deviceId.toStdString()) == res.device_keys.end())) {
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nhlog::net()->warn("no devices retrieved {}", user_id_);
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return;
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}
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this->their_keys = res;
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});
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cache::client()->query_keys(
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http::client()->user_id().to_string(),
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[this](const UserKeyCache &res, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
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if (err) {
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nhlog::net()->warn("failed to query device keys: {},{}",
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mtx::errors::to_string(err->matrix_error.errcode),
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static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
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return;
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}
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if (res.master_keys.keys.empty())
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return;
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if (auto status = cache::verificationStatus(http::client()->user_id().to_string());
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status && status->user_verified == crypto::Trust::Verified)
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this->our_trusted_master_key = res.master_keys.keys.begin()->second;
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});
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if (model) {
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connect(this->model_,
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&TimelineModel::updateFlowEventId,
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this,
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[this](const std::string &event_id_) {
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this->relation.rel_type = mtx::common::RelationType::Reference;
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this->relation.event_id = event_id_;
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this->transaction_id = event_id_;
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});
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}
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connect(timeout, &QTimer::timeout, this, [this]() {
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nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: timeout");
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if (state_ != Success && state_ != Failed)
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this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::Timeout);
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});
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connect(ChatPage::instance(),
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&ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationStart,
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this,
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&DeviceVerificationFlow::handleStartMessage);
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connect(ChatPage::instance(),
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&ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationAccept,
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this,
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[this](const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationAccept &msg) {
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nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: received accept");
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if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
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if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
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return;
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} else if (msg.relations.references()) {
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if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
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return;
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}
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if ((msg.key_agreement_protocol == "curve25519-hkdf-sha256") &&
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(msg.hash == "sha256") &&
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(msg.message_authentication_code == "hkdf-hmac-sha256")) {
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this->commitment = msg.commitment;
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if (std::find(msg.short_authentication_string.begin(),
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msg.short_authentication_string.end(),
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mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji) !=
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msg.short_authentication_string.end()) {
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this->method = mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji;
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} else {
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this->method = mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal;
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}
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this->mac_method = msg.message_authentication_code;
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this->sendVerificationKey();
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} else {
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this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::UnknownMethod);
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}
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});
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connect(ChatPage::instance(),
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&ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationCancel,
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this,
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[this](const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationCancel &msg) {
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nhlog::crypto()->info(
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"verification: received cancel, {} : {}", msg.code, msg.reason);
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if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
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if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
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return;
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} else if (msg.relations.references()) {
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if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
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return;
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}
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error_ = User;
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emit errorChanged();
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setState(Failed);
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});
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connect(
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ChatPage::instance(),
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&ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationKey,
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this,
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[this](const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationKey &msg) {
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nhlog::crypto()->info(
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"verification: received key, sender {}, state {}", sender, state().toStdString());
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if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
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if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
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return;
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} else if (msg.relations.references()) {
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if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
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return;
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}
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if (sender) {
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if (state_ != WaitingForOtherToAccept && state_ != WaitingForKeys) {
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this->cancelVerification(OutOfOrder);
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return;
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}
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} else {
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if (state_ != WaitingForKeys) {
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this->cancelVerification(OutOfOrder);
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return;
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}
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}
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this->sas->set_their_key(msg.key);
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std::string info;
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if (this->sender == true) {
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info = "MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_SAS|" + http::client()->user_id().to_string() + "|" +
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http::client()->device_id() + "|" + this->sas->public_key() + "|" +
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this->toClient.to_string() + "|" + this->deviceId.toStdString() + "|" +
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msg.key + "|" + this->transaction_id;
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} else {
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info = "MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_SAS|" + this->toClient.to_string() + "|" +
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this->deviceId.toStdString() + "|" + msg.key + "|" +
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http::client()->user_id().to_string() + "|" + http::client()->device_id() +
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"|" + this->sas->public_key() + "|" + this->transaction_id;
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}
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nhlog::ui()->info("Info is: '{}'", info);
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if (this->sender == false) {
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this->sendVerificationKey();
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} else {
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if (this->commitment != mtx::crypto::bin2base64_unpadded(
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mtx::crypto::sha256(msg.key + this->canonical_json))) {
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this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::MismatchedCommitment);
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return;
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}
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}
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if (this->method == mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji) {
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this->sasList = this->sas->generate_bytes_emoji(info);
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setState(CompareEmoji);
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} else if (this->method == mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal) {
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this->sasList = this->sas->generate_bytes_decimal(info);
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setState(CompareNumber);
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}
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});
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connect(
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ChatPage::instance(),
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&ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationMac,
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this,
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[this](const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac &msg) {
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nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: received mac");
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if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
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if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
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return;
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} else if (msg.relations.references()) {
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if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
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return;
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}
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std::map<std::string, std::string> key_list;
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std::string key_string;
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for (const auto &mac : msg.mac) {
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for (const auto &[deviceid, key] : their_keys.device_keys) {
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(void)deviceid;
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if (key.keys.count(mac.first))
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key_list[mac.first] = key.keys.at(mac.first);
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}
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if (their_keys.master_keys.keys.count(mac.first))
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key_list[mac.first] = their_keys.master_keys.keys[mac.first];
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if (their_keys.user_signing_keys.keys.count(mac.first))
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key_list[mac.first] = their_keys.user_signing_keys.keys[mac.first];
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if (their_keys.self_signing_keys.keys.count(mac.first))
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key_list[mac.first] = their_keys.self_signing_keys.keys[mac.first];
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}
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auto macs = key_verification_mac(sas.get(),
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toClient,
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this->deviceId.toStdString(),
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http::client()->user_id(),
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http::client()->device_id(),
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this->transaction_id,
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key_list);
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for (const auto &[key, mac] : macs.mac) {
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if (mac != msg.mac.at(key)) {
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this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::KeyMismatch);
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return;
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}
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}
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if (msg.keys == macs.keys) {
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mtx::requests::KeySignaturesUpload req;
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if (utils::localUser().toStdString() == this->toClient.to_string()) {
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// self verification, sign master key with device key, if we
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// verified it
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for (const auto &mac : msg.mac) {
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if (their_keys.master_keys.keys.count(mac.first)) {
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nlohmann::json j = their_keys.master_keys;
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j.erase("signatures");
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j.erase("unsigned");
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mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys master_key =
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j.get<mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys>();
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master_key.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()]
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["ed25519:" + http::client()->device_id()] =
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olm::client()->sign_message(j.dump());
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req.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()]
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[master_key.keys.at(mac.first)] = master_key;
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} else if (mac.first == "ed25519:" + this->deviceId.toStdString()) {
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// Sign their device key with self signing key
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auto device_id = this->deviceId.toStdString();
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if (their_keys.device_keys.count(device_id)) {
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nlohmann::json j = their_keys.device_keys.at(device_id);
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j.erase("signatures");
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j.erase("unsigned");
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auto secret = cache::secret(
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mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_self_signing);
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if (!secret)
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continue;
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auto ssk = mtx::crypto::PkSigning::from_seed(*secret);
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mtx::crypto::DeviceKeys dev = j.get<mtx::crypto::DeviceKeys>();
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dev.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()]
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["ed25519:" + ssk.public_key()] = ssk.sign(j.dump());
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req.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()][device_id] = dev;
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}
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}
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}
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} else {
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// Sign their master key with user signing key
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for (const auto &mac : msg.mac) {
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if (their_keys.master_keys.keys.count(mac.first)) {
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nlohmann::json j = their_keys.master_keys;
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j.erase("signatures");
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j.erase("unsigned");
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auto secret =
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cache::secret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_user_signing);
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if (!secret)
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continue;
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auto usk = mtx::crypto::PkSigning::from_seed(*secret);
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mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys master_key =
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j.get<mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys>();
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master_key.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()]
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["ed25519:" + usk.public_key()] = usk.sign(j.dump());
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req.signatures[toClient.to_string()][master_key.keys.at(mac.first)] =
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master_key;
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}
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}
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}
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if (!req.signatures.empty()) {
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http::client()->keys_signatures_upload(
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req,
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[](const mtx::responses::KeySignaturesUpload &res, mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
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if (err) {
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nhlog::net()->error("failed to upload signatures: {},{}",
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mtx::errors::to_string(err->matrix_error.errcode),
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static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
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}
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// MSVC bug, error C3493: 'key_id' cannot be implicitly captured because no
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// default capture mode has been specified
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// for (const auto &[user_id, tmp] : res.errors)
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// for (const auto &[key_id, e] : tmp)
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// nhlog::net()->error("signature error for user {} and key "
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// "id {}: {}, {}",
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// user_id,
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// key_id,
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// mtx::errors::to_string(e.errcode),
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// e.error);
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for (const auto &error : res.errors) {
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const auto &user_id = error.first;
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for (const auto &key_error : error.second) {
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const auto &key_id = key_error.first;
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const auto &e = key_error.second;
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nhlog::net()->error("signature error for user {} and key "
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"id {}: {}, {}",
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user_id,
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key_id,
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mtx::errors::to_string(e.errcode),
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e.error);
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}
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}
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});
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}
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this->isMacVerified = true;
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this->acceptDevice();
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} else {
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this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::KeyMismatch);
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}
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});
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connect(
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ChatPage::instance(),
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&ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationReady,
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this,
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[this](const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationReady &msg) {
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nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: received ready {}", (void *)this);
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if (!sender) {
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if (msg.from_device != http::client()->device_id()) {
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error_ = User;
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emit errorChanged();
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setState(Failed);
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}
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return;
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}
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if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
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if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
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return;
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if (this->deviceId.isEmpty() && this->deviceIds.size() > 1) {
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auto from = QString::fromStdString(msg.from_device);
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if (std::find(deviceIds.begin(), deviceIds.end(), from) != deviceIds.end()) {
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mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationCancel req{};
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req.code = "m.user";
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req.reason = "accepted by other device";
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req.transaction_id = this->transaction_id;
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mtx::requests::ToDeviceMessages<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationCancel> body;
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for (const auto &d : this->deviceIds) {
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if (d != from)
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body[this->toClient][d.toStdString()] = req;
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}
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http::client()->send_to_device(
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http::client()->generate_txn_id(), body, [](mtx::http::RequestErr err) {
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if (err)
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nhlog::net()->warn(
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"failed to send verification to_device message: {} {}",
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err->matrix_error.error,
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static_cast<int>(err->status_code));
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});
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this->deviceId = from;
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this->deviceIds = {from};
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}
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}
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} else if (msg.relations.references()) {
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if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
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return;
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else {
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this->deviceId = QString::fromStdString(msg.from_device);
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}
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} else {
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return;
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}
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nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: received ready sending start {}", (void *)this);
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this->startVerificationRequest();
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});
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connect(ChatPage::instance(),
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&ChatPage::receivedDeviceVerificationDone,
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this,
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[this](const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationDone &msg) {
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nhlog::crypto()->info("verification: received done");
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if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
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if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
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return;
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} else if (msg.relations.references()) {
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if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
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return;
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}
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nhlog::ui()->info("Flow done on other side");
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});
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timeout->start(TIMEOUT);
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}
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QString
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DeviceVerificationFlow::state()
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{
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switch (state_) {
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case PromptStartVerification:
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return QStringLiteral("PromptStartVerification");
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case CompareEmoji:
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return QStringLiteral("CompareEmoji");
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case CompareNumber:
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return QStringLiteral("CompareNumber");
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case WaitingForKeys:
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return QStringLiteral("WaitingForKeys");
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case WaitingForOtherToAccept:
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return QStringLiteral("WaitingForOtherToAccept");
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case WaitingForMac:
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return QStringLiteral("WaitingForMac");
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case Success:
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return QStringLiteral("Success");
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case Failed:
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return QStringLiteral("Failed");
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default:
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return QString();
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}
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}
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void
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DeviceVerificationFlow::next()
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{
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if (sender) {
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switch (state_) {
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case PromptStartVerification:
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sendVerificationRequest();
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break;
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case CompareEmoji:
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case CompareNumber:
|
|
sendVerificationMac();
|
|
break;
|
|
case WaitingForKeys:
|
|
case WaitingForOtherToAccept:
|
|
case WaitingForMac:
|
|
case Success:
|
|
case Failed:
|
|
nhlog::db()->error("verification: Invalid state transition!");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
switch (state_) {
|
|
case PromptStartVerification:
|
|
if (canonical_json.empty())
|
|
sendVerificationReady();
|
|
else // legacy path without request and ready
|
|
acceptVerificationRequest();
|
|
break;
|
|
case CompareEmoji:
|
|
[[fallthrough]];
|
|
case CompareNumber:
|
|
sendVerificationMac();
|
|
break;
|
|
case WaitingForKeys:
|
|
case WaitingForOtherToAccept:
|
|
case WaitingForMac:
|
|
case Success:
|
|
case Failed:
|
|
nhlog::db()->error("verification: Invalid state transition!");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QString
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::getUserId()
|
|
{
|
|
return QString::fromStdString(this->toClient.to_string());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QString
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::getDeviceId()
|
|
{
|
|
return this->deviceId;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::getSender()
|
|
{
|
|
return this->sender;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::vector<int>
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::getSasList()
|
|
{
|
|
return this->sasList;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::isSelfVerification() const
|
|
{
|
|
return this->toClient.to_string() == http::client()->user_id().to_string();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::setEventId(const std::string &event_id_)
|
|
{
|
|
this->relation.rel_type = mtx::common::RelationType::Reference;
|
|
this->relation.event_id = event_id_;
|
|
this->transaction_id = event_id_;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::handleStartMessage(const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart &msg,
|
|
std::string)
|
|
{
|
|
if (msg.transaction_id.has_value()) {
|
|
if (msg.transaction_id.value() != this->transaction_id)
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if (msg.relations.references()) {
|
|
if (msg.relations.references() != this->relation.event_id)
|
|
return;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((std::find(msg.key_agreement_protocols.begin(),
|
|
msg.key_agreement_protocols.end(),
|
|
"curve25519-hkdf-sha256") != msg.key_agreement_protocols.end()) &&
|
|
(std::find(msg.hashes.begin(), msg.hashes.end(), "sha256") != msg.hashes.end()) &&
|
|
(std::find(msg.message_authentication_codes.begin(),
|
|
msg.message_authentication_codes.end(),
|
|
"hkdf-hmac-sha256") != msg.message_authentication_codes.end())) {
|
|
if (std::find(msg.short_authentication_string.begin(),
|
|
msg.short_authentication_string.end(),
|
|
mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji) !=
|
|
msg.short_authentication_string.end()) {
|
|
this->method = mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji;
|
|
} else if (std::find(msg.short_authentication_string.begin(),
|
|
msg.short_authentication_string.end(),
|
|
mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal) !=
|
|
msg.short_authentication_string.end()) {
|
|
this->method = mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal;
|
|
} else {
|
|
this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::UnknownMethod);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!sender)
|
|
this->canonical_json = nlohmann::json(msg).dump();
|
|
else {
|
|
// resolve glare
|
|
if (std::tuple(this->toClient.to_string(), this->deviceId.toStdString()) <
|
|
std::tuple(utils::localUser().toStdString(), http::client()->device_id())) {
|
|
// treat this as if the user with the smaller mxid or smaller deviceid (if the mxid
|
|
// was the same) was the sender of "start"
|
|
this->canonical_json = nlohmann::json(msg).dump();
|
|
this->sender = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (msg.method != mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1) {
|
|
cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::UnknownMethod);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we didn't send "start", accept the verification (otherwise wait for the other side to
|
|
// accept
|
|
if (state_ != PromptStartVerification && !sender)
|
|
this->acceptVerificationRequest();
|
|
} else {
|
|
this->cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::UnknownMethod);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//! accepts a verification
|
|
void
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::acceptVerificationRequest()
|
|
{
|
|
if (acceptSent)
|
|
return;
|
|
acceptSent = true;
|
|
|
|
mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationAccept req;
|
|
|
|
req.method = mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1;
|
|
req.key_agreement_protocol = "curve25519-hkdf-sha256";
|
|
req.hash = "sha256";
|
|
req.message_authentication_code = "hkdf-hmac-sha256";
|
|
if (this->method == mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji)
|
|
req.short_authentication_string = {mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji};
|
|
else if (this->method == mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal)
|
|
req.short_authentication_string = {mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal};
|
|
req.commitment = mtx::crypto::bin2base64_unpadded(
|
|
mtx::crypto::sha256(this->sas->public_key() + this->canonical_json));
|
|
|
|
send(req);
|
|
setState(WaitingForKeys);
|
|
}
|
|
//! responds verification request
|
|
void
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::sendVerificationReady()
|
|
{
|
|
mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationReady req;
|
|
|
|
req.from_device = http::client()->device_id();
|
|
req.methods = {mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1};
|
|
|
|
send(req);
|
|
setState(WaitingForKeys);
|
|
}
|
|
//! accepts a verification
|
|
void
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::sendVerificationDone()
|
|
{
|
|
mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationDone req;
|
|
|
|
send(req);
|
|
}
|
|
//! starts the verification flow
|
|
void
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::startVerificationRequest()
|
|
{
|
|
if (startSent)
|
|
return;
|
|
startSent = true;
|
|
|
|
mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart req;
|
|
|
|
req.from_device = http::client()->device_id();
|
|
req.method = mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1;
|
|
req.key_agreement_protocols = {"curve25519-hkdf-sha256"};
|
|
req.hashes = {"sha256"};
|
|
req.message_authentication_codes = {"hkdf-hmac-sha256"};
|
|
req.short_authentication_string = {mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Decimal,
|
|
mtx::events::msg::SASMethods::Emoji};
|
|
|
|
if (this->type == DeviceVerificationFlow::Type::ToDevice) {
|
|
mtx::requests::ToDeviceMessages<mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart> body;
|
|
req.transaction_id = this->transaction_id;
|
|
this->canonical_json = nlohmann::json(req).dump();
|
|
} else if (this->type == DeviceVerificationFlow::Type::RoomMsg && model_) {
|
|
req.relations.relations.push_back(this->relation);
|
|
// Set synthesized to surpress the nheko relation extensions
|
|
req.relations.synthesized = true;
|
|
this->canonical_json = nlohmann::json(req).dump();
|
|
}
|
|
send(req);
|
|
setState(WaitingForOtherToAccept);
|
|
}
|
|
//! sends a verification request
|
|
void
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::sendVerificationRequest()
|
|
{
|
|
mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationRequest req;
|
|
|
|
req.from_device = http::client()->device_id();
|
|
req.methods = {mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1};
|
|
|
|
if (this->type == DeviceVerificationFlow::Type::ToDevice) {
|
|
QDateTime currentTime = QDateTime::currentDateTimeUtc();
|
|
|
|
req.timestamp = (uint64_t)currentTime.toMSecsSinceEpoch();
|
|
|
|
} else if (this->type == DeviceVerificationFlow::Type::RoomMsg && model_) {
|
|
req.to = this->toClient.to_string();
|
|
req.msgtype = "m.key.verification.request";
|
|
// clang-format off
|
|
// clang-format < 12 is buggy on this
|
|
req.body = "User is requesting to verify keys with you. However, your client does "
|
|
"not support this method, so you will need to use the legacy method of "
|
|
"key verification.";
|
|
// clang-format on
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
send(req);
|
|
setState(WaitingForOtherToAccept);
|
|
}
|
|
//! cancels a verification flow
|
|
void
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::cancelVerification(DeviceVerificationFlow::Error error_code)
|
|
{
|
|
if (state_ == State::Success || state_ == State::Failed)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationCancel req;
|
|
|
|
if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::UnknownMethod) {
|
|
req.code = "m.unknown_method";
|
|
req.reason = "unknown method received";
|
|
} else if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::MismatchedCommitment) {
|
|
req.code = "m.mismatched_commitment";
|
|
req.reason = "commitment didn't match";
|
|
} else if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::MismatchedSAS) {
|
|
req.code = "m.mismatched_sas";
|
|
req.reason = "sas didn't match";
|
|
} else if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::KeyMismatch) {
|
|
req.code = "m.key_match";
|
|
req.reason = "keys did not match";
|
|
} else if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::Timeout) {
|
|
req.code = "m.timeout";
|
|
req.reason = "timed out";
|
|
} else if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::User) {
|
|
req.code = "m.user";
|
|
req.reason = "user cancelled the verification";
|
|
} else if (error_code == DeviceVerificationFlow::Error::OutOfOrder) {
|
|
req.code = "m.unexpected_message";
|
|
req.reason = "received messages out of order";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
this->error_ = error_code;
|
|
this->setState(Failed);
|
|
emit errorChanged();
|
|
|
|
send(req);
|
|
}
|
|
//! sends the verification key
|
|
void
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::sendVerificationKey()
|
|
{
|
|
if (keySent)
|
|
return;
|
|
keySent = true;
|
|
|
|
mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationKey req;
|
|
|
|
req.key = this->sas->public_key();
|
|
|
|
send(req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac
|
|
key_verification_mac(mtx::crypto::SAS *sas,
|
|
mtx::identifiers::User sender,
|
|
const std::string &senderDevice,
|
|
mtx::identifiers::User receiver,
|
|
const std::string &receiverDevice,
|
|
const std::string &transactionId,
|
|
std::map<std::string, std::string> keys)
|
|
{
|
|
mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac req;
|
|
|
|
std::string info = "MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_MAC" + sender.to_string() + senderDevice +
|
|
receiver.to_string() + receiverDevice + transactionId;
|
|
|
|
std::string key_list;
|
|
bool first = true;
|
|
for (const auto &[key_id, key] : keys) {
|
|
req.mac[key_id] = sas->calculate_mac(key, info + key_id);
|
|
|
|
if (!first)
|
|
key_list += ",";
|
|
key_list += key_id;
|
|
first = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
req.keys = sas->calculate_mac(key_list, info + "KEY_IDS");
|
|
|
|
return req;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//! sends the mac of the keys
|
|
void
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::sendVerificationMac()
|
|
{
|
|
if (macSent)
|
|
return;
|
|
macSent = true;
|
|
|
|
std::map<std::string, std::string> key_list;
|
|
key_list["ed25519:" + http::client()->device_id()] = olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519;
|
|
|
|
// send our master key, if we trust it
|
|
if (!this->our_trusted_master_key.empty())
|
|
key_list["ed25519:" + our_trusted_master_key] = our_trusted_master_key;
|
|
|
|
mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationMac req = key_verification_mac(sas.get(),
|
|
http::client()->user_id(),
|
|
http::client()->device_id(),
|
|
this->toClient,
|
|
this->deviceId.toStdString(),
|
|
this->transaction_id,
|
|
key_list);
|
|
|
|
send(req);
|
|
|
|
setState(WaitingForMac);
|
|
acceptDevice();
|
|
}
|
|
//! Completes the verification flow
|
|
void
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::acceptDevice()
|
|
{
|
|
if (!isMacVerified) {
|
|
setState(WaitingForMac);
|
|
} else if (state_ == WaitingForMac) {
|
|
cache::markDeviceVerified(this->toClient.to_string(), this->deviceId.toStdString());
|
|
this->sendVerificationDone();
|
|
setState(Success);
|
|
|
|
// Request secrets. We should probably check somehow, if a device knowns about the
|
|
// secrets.
|
|
if (utils::localUser().toStdString() == this->toClient.to_string() &&
|
|
(!cache::secret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_self_signing) ||
|
|
!cache::secret(mtx::secret_storage::secrets::cross_signing_user_signing))) {
|
|
olm::request_cross_signing_keys();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::unverify()
|
|
{
|
|
cache::markDeviceUnverified(this->toClient.to_string(), this->deviceId.toStdString());
|
|
|
|
emit refreshProfile();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow>
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::NewInRoomVerification(QObject *parent_,
|
|
TimelineModel *timelineModel_,
|
|
const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationRequest &msg,
|
|
const QString &other_user_,
|
|
const QString &event_id_)
|
|
{
|
|
QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> flow(
|
|
new DeviceVerificationFlow(parent_,
|
|
Type::RoomMsg,
|
|
timelineModel_,
|
|
other_user_,
|
|
{QString::fromStdString(msg.from_device)}));
|
|
|
|
flow->setEventId(event_id_.toStdString());
|
|
|
|
if (std::find(msg.methods.begin(),
|
|
msg.methods.end(),
|
|
mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1) == msg.methods.end()) {
|
|
flow->cancelVerification(UnknownMethod);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return flow;
|
|
}
|
|
QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow>
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::NewToDeviceVerification(QObject *parent_,
|
|
const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationRequest &msg,
|
|
const QString &other_user_,
|
|
const QString &txn_id_)
|
|
{
|
|
QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> flow(new DeviceVerificationFlow(
|
|
parent_, Type::ToDevice, nullptr, other_user_, {QString::fromStdString(msg.from_device)}));
|
|
flow->transaction_id = txn_id_.toStdString();
|
|
|
|
if (std::find(msg.methods.begin(),
|
|
msg.methods.end(),
|
|
mtx::events::msg::VerificationMethods::SASv1) == msg.methods.end()) {
|
|
flow->cancelVerification(UnknownMethod);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return flow;
|
|
}
|
|
QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow>
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::NewToDeviceVerification(QObject *parent_,
|
|
const mtx::events::msg::KeyVerificationStart &msg,
|
|
const QString &other_user_,
|
|
const QString &txn_id_)
|
|
{
|
|
QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> flow(new DeviceVerificationFlow(
|
|
parent_, Type::ToDevice, nullptr, other_user_, {QString::fromStdString(msg.from_device)}));
|
|
flow->transaction_id = txn_id_.toStdString();
|
|
|
|
flow->handleStartMessage(msg, "");
|
|
|
|
return flow;
|
|
}
|
|
QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow>
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::InitiateUserVerification(QObject *parent_,
|
|
TimelineModel *timelineModel_,
|
|
const QString &userid)
|
|
{
|
|
QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> flow(
|
|
new DeviceVerificationFlow(parent_, Type::RoomMsg, timelineModel_, userid, {}));
|
|
flow->sender = true;
|
|
return flow;
|
|
}
|
|
QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow>
|
|
DeviceVerificationFlow::InitiateDeviceVerification(QObject *parent_,
|
|
const QString &userid,
|
|
const std::vector<QString> &devices)
|
|
{
|
|
assert(!devices.empty());
|
|
|
|
QSharedPointer<DeviceVerificationFlow> flow(
|
|
new DeviceVerificationFlow(parent_, Type::ToDevice, nullptr, userid, devices));
|
|
|
|
flow->sender = true;
|
|
flow->transaction_id = http::client()->generate_txn_id();
|
|
|
|
return flow;
|
|
}
|