matrixion/src/CacheCryptoStructs.h
Nicolas Werner ff82452816
Upgrade trust of megolm sessions when receiving RoomKey
Before we only did that, when we basically didn't have the key yet. But
since we usually get sent a RoomKey when a new message is sent after we
sign in, we were discarding, that those messages should usually now be
trusted.
2023-11-19 20:11:21 +01:00

207 lines
5.8 KiB
C++

// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Nheko Contributors
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
#pragma once
#include <QObject>
#include <QQmlEngine>
#include <map>
#include <mutex>
#include <set>
#include <mtx/events/encrypted.hpp>
#include <mtx/responses/crypto.hpp>
#include <mtxclient/crypto/objects.hpp>
namespace crypto {
Q_NAMESPACE
QML_NAMED_ELEMENT(Crypto)
//! How much a participant is trusted.
enum Trust
{
Unverified, //! Device unverified or master key changed.
MessageUnverified, //! Only for messages. The sender might be trusted, but we don't know, who
//! was the sender for the message.
TOFU, //! Device is signed by the sender, but the user is not verified, but they never
//! changed the master key.
Verified, //! User was verified and has crosssigned this device or device is verified.
};
Q_ENUM_NS(Trust)
}
struct DeviceKeysToMsgIndex
{
// map from device key to message_index
// Using the device id is safe because we check for reuse on device list updates
// Using the device id makes our logic much easier to read.
std::map<std::string, uint32_t> deviceids;
};
struct SharedWithUsers
{
// userid to keys
std::map<std::string, DeviceKeysToMsgIndex> keys;
};
// Extra information associated with an outbound megolm session.
struct GroupSessionData
{
uint64_t timestamp = 0;
uint32_t message_index = 0;
// We generally don't trust keys unless they were sent to us by the original sender and include
// that senders signature.
bool trusted = false;
// the original 25519 key
std::string sender_key;
std::string sender_claimed_ed25519_key;
std::vector<std::string> forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
//! map from index to event_id to check for replay attacks
std::map<uint32_t, std::string> indices;
// who has access to this session.
// Rotate, when a user leaves the room and share, when a user gets added.
SharedWithUsers currently;
};
void
to_json(nlohmann::json &obj, const GroupSessionData &msg);
void
from_json(const nlohmann::json &obj, GroupSessionData &msg);
struct OutboundGroupSessionDataRef
{
mtx::crypto::OutboundGroupSessionPtr session;
GroupSessionData data;
};
struct DevicePublicKeys
{
std::string ed25519;
std::string curve25519;
};
void
to_json(nlohmann::json &obj, const DevicePublicKeys &msg);
void
from_json(const nlohmann::json &obj, DevicePublicKeys &msg);
//! Represents a unique megolm session identifier.
struct MegolmSessionIndex
{
MegolmSessionIndex() = default;
MegolmSessionIndex(std::string room_id_, const mtx::events::msg::Encrypted &e)
: room_id(std::move(room_id_))
, session_id(e.session_id)
{
}
//! The room in which this session exists.
std::string room_id;
//! The session_id of the megolm session.
std::string session_id;
};
void
to_json(nlohmann::json &obj, const MegolmSessionIndex &msg);
void
from_json(const nlohmann::json &obj, MegolmSessionIndex &msg);
struct StoredOlmSession
{
std::uint64_t last_message_ts = 0;
std::string pickled_session;
};
void
to_json(nlohmann::json &obj, const StoredOlmSession &msg);
void
from_json(const nlohmann::json &obj, StoredOlmSession &msg);
//! Verification status of a single user
struct VerificationStatus
{
//! True, if the users master key is verified
crypto::Trust user_verified = crypto::Trust::Unverified;
//! List of all devices marked as verified
std::set<std::string> verified_devices;
//! Map from sender key/curve25519 to trust status
std::map<std::string, crypto::Trust> verified_device_keys;
//! Count of unverified devices
int unverified_device_count = 0;
// if the keys are not in cache
bool no_keys = false;
};
//! In memory cache of verification status
struct VerificationStorage
{
//! mapping of user to verification status
std::map<std::string, VerificationStatus> status;
std::mutex verification_storage_mtx;
};
//! In memory cache of verification status
struct SecretsStorage
{
//! secret name -> secret
std::map<std::string, std::string> secrets;
std::mutex mtx;
};
// this will store the keys of the user with whom a encrypted room is shared with
struct UserKeyCache
{
//! Device id to device keys
std::map<std::string, mtx::crypto::DeviceKeys> device_keys;
//! cross signing keys
mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys master_keys, user_signing_keys, self_signing_keys;
//! Sync token when nheko last fetched the keys
std::string updated_at;
//! Sync token when the keys last changed. updated != last_changed means they are outdated.
std::string last_changed;
//! if the master key has ever changed
bool master_key_changed = false;
//! Device keys that were already used at least once
std::set<std::string> seen_device_keys;
//! Device ids that were already used at least once
std::set<std::string> seen_device_ids;
};
void
to_json(nlohmann::json &j, const UserKeyCache &info);
void
from_json(const nlohmann::json &j, UserKeyCache &info);
// the reason these are stored in a seperate cache rather than storing it in the user cache is
// UserKeyCache stores only keys of users with which encrypted room is shared
struct VerificationCache
{
//! list of verified device_ids with device-verification
std::set<std::string> device_verified;
//! list of devices the user blocks
std::set<std::string> device_blocked;
};
void
to_json(nlohmann::json &j, const VerificationCache &info);
void
from_json(const nlohmann::json &j, VerificationCache &info);
struct OnlineBackupVersion
{
//! the version of the online backup currently enabled
std::string version;
//! the algorithm used by the backup
std::string algorithm;
};
void
to_json(nlohmann::json &j, const OnlineBackupVersion &info);
void
from_json(const nlohmann::json &j, OnlineBackupVersion &info);